As it stands, those now involved in the debate over the nature of perception fall into two camps: those who think that perception does require material alteration and those who (along with Burnyeat) think that it does not.4 When it comes to the account of thought, we are confronted with a less tidy situation: (1 ) some suggest that Aristotle is a physicalist or a functionalist about thought, taking it to be somehow realized in material alteration within the body, (2) others suggest that he is a dualist, taking mind or at least the famous productive intellect of DA III.5 to be immaterial and not dependent on the body in any way, and (3) yet others suggest that thought presupposes material alteration as an antecedent causal condition, but that episodes of thought needn't depend on episodes of material alteration.5 These are only a few of the approaches to the account of thought found in the recent literature, but they sufficiently illustrate the variety among contemporary interpretations.
In this paper, I would like to sketch my own account of the relation between cognitive activity and material alteration within Aristotle's psychological theory. I will begin by suggesting a new framework through which to view the important issues ( §2). I will then show that on Aristotle's account material alteration is required both for any episode of perception in animals taken generally ( §3) and for any episode of thought in human beings ( §4). Finally, I will examine Aristotle's rationale for supposing that material alteration is required for human thought ( §5).
§2.
We moderns tend not to make a distinction between two different philosophically interesting questions. First, (1 ) is it necessary for a φ -ing thing to have a body (where Φ-ing is a type of cognitive functioning)? Second, (2) do episodes of Φ-ing necessarily involve bodily changes? We tend not to distinguish between these questions, because for the most part we think that an answer to the first implies a like answer to the second. If we think that one must have a body in order to perceive, then we suppose that the act of perceiving must involve bodily changes and if we suppose that one needn't have a body in order to think, then we also suppose that the act of thinking (even for creatures with bodies) needn't involve bodily changes.
Aristotle offers straightforward answers to our first question: it is necessary for a perceiving thing to have a body and it is not necessary for a thinking thing to have one. Perception serves a These straightforward answers to our first question should not be taken to imply like answers to our second. In the case of perception, (as I have already indicated) arguments have been advanced which suggest that material alteration is not a requirement for particular episodes. These arguments possess prima facie plausibility. So, we must look to the texts in order to determine where Aristotle stands in respect to our second question about perception. In the case of thought, the texts themselves foster a sense of confusion. Aristotle repeatedly claims that nous is separable.7 Specifically, he gives every sign of thinking that it is separable from the body.8 This suggests that he is some sort of dualist. However, he also thinks that thought is not without imagination9 and, since it may be that imagination involves material alteration, this at least suggests that thought is somehow dependent upon material alteration. So, we must look attentively to the texts in order to determine where Aristotle stands in respect to our second question about thought. In trying to get clear on Aristotle's understanding of the relation between thought and material alteration we Should note that the outcome of our own investigation into perception will be of some use; for if perception has necessary material conditions but no distinctive or sufficient material conditions (more precisely, if it does not involve material alteration), this suggests that thought has neither necessary nor sufficient material conditions, since Aristotle claims that nous is less bodily than aisthesis. 11. In DA 11.5 Aristotle is also concerned with navigating among the abstract notions of settled state (hexis) and affection (pathos). In Categories (Cat.) 14 he says that alteration is change in quality (metabole kata to poion; 1 5b 12-13). He does not consider whether there are types of al/oiosis in this chapter, but in an earlier chapter (Cat. 8), he claims that there are four types of qualities. There are (1) settled states (8b25ff), (2) dispositions (9a16), (3) passive qualities or affections (9a28-29), and (4) shapes (1 Oal 1 -12). Two of these types, settled states (hexeis) and affections (pathai), are especiailv relevant to the discussion of potentiality and actuality in DA 11.5. A hexis is i aua:iry ;hat is ¡ong lasting and stable. One of the examples of hexis cited in Cat. 8 (as well as in DA il.5) is knowledge.(8b29) Once we come to have knowledge it is hard to lose. An important difference between a hexis and a pathos is that the latter is neither long lasting nor stable; it is the sort of quality that comes and goes. Aristotle gives the example of someone blushing due to shame. We say that such a person has been affected.(9b33) We do not say that he has acquired a hexis; for this is a temporary occurrence. By comparison the man whose face is always red is said to have a ruddy complexion; he is said to have a hexis. (9b31 -32) As we read on in the chapter, we find that Aristotle says that among the types of qualities hexeis are in fact qualities, but twice he says that pathe are not qualities. (9b33, 10 a l 0) Here Aristotle singles out hexeis as the most perfect qualities. These settled states are long lasting and stable, while affections are not. Thus, pathe are classified as qualities, but they are not (if you will) commended as qualities; they are not the most perfect sorts of qualities.
We may infer from this discussion that pathe either are not qualities or they differ in kind from the qualities that are hexeis and, since each sort of quality is brought about by a corresponding sort of al/oiosis, it follows that the al/oiosis which brings about a pathos is either not an al/oiosis or is a different kind of al/oiosis from that which brings about a hexis. But notice, this is precisely what Aristotle says about the transition to active perception in DA 11.5; it is either not an alloiosis or it is alloiosis of a different sort. (4 1 7b6-7) This suggests that Aristotle's reluctance to say that the transition is an alloiosis is due to the fact that it does not bring about a hexis; it does not bring about a settled state of perception. So (again) we see that Aristotle's claim regarding the transition to active perception need not be taken to speak directly to the question of whether material alteration is involved. Rather, it seems to speak to an abstract distinction between settled states and affections, a distinction that can be maintained regardless of whether particular states or affections come to be as the result of material alteration. 
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